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Unequal Exchange: Developing Countries
in the International Trade Negotiations
Julio J. Nogue ´s
International Trade Policies and Institutions, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Abstract
The results of the Uruguay Round, show that the concessions given by
developing countries were generally more valuable than those they
received from industrial countries. I suggest that this outcome is explained
by aggressive demands from industrial countries, and by the lack of
resources at the disposal of developing countries. These and other
‘structural factors’ weaken the negotiating capacity of developing
countries and the outcome of their bargaining is likely to be an ‘unequal
exchange of concessions’. The chapter discusses the costs of these
exchanges, and the structural factors that help to understand the processes
leading to these outcomes.
Keywords: Latin America, Uruguay Round, reciprocity
JEL classiﬁcations: F13, F15
Developing countries have to have the courage to insist that all reasonable doubt as
to the economic effects of a proposed agreement be removed before they allow a
decision to be approved. (J. Michael Finger).
12.1. Introduction
The history of the ﬁrst rounds of multilateral trade negotiations shows that
the exchange of market access concessions was a process characterized
by reciprocity and mutual beneﬁts among participating countries. More
recently, however, the results of the Uruguay Round, where for the ﬁrst
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41time developing countries negotiated actively, show that the concessions
given by them were more valuable than those they received. In these
negotiations, developing countries did not achieve the degree of
reciprocity expected from the previous history of the trading system.
This outcome has been explained in part by increasingly aggressive
demands by industrial countries and in part, by the lack of adequate
resources of least developed countries. These and other ‘structural
factors’ such as lack of negotiating experience and inadequate knowledge
on economic impacts weaken the negotiating capacity of developing
countries and suggest that in multilateral or regional trade negotiations
with industrial countries, they are at a disadvantage. The thesis of this
chapter is that these exchange of concessions are most likely to be
‘unequal exchanges’.
Unequal exchanges result in unbalanced outcomes and this can
have serious consequences for developing countries and the trading
system. For developing countries, an unbalanced outcome as measured by
the difference between the valueof concessionsgiven and received hastwo
economic costs: (a) the costs associated with a degree of access to foreign
markets that is lower than the one that would have resulted from balanced
negotiations, and (b) the costs associated with the weakening of their
bargaining power implied by ‘excessive concessions’ given in past
negotiations. For the trading system, unequal exchange negotiations also
have serious negative consequences. This is illustrated, for example, by
the ‘implementation’ problems faced by developing countries in several of
the Uruguay Round agreements which may have not surfaced under
less unequal negotiations. These implementation problems are one of the
factors that soured relations among WTO members and threatened to
block the launching of a new multilateral round in Doha (World Trade
Organization, 2001a).
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 12.2 illustrates
the signiﬁcant gains that efﬁcient agricultural producers could reap in
international negotiations. Section 12.3 takes up the Uruguay Round
as an example of a negotiation characterized by an unbalanced outcome
explainedinpartbyan‘unequalexchange’process.Section12.4delineates
some of the elements that help to understand why some trade negotiations
are likely to result in ‘unequal exchanges’. It starts by presenting some
of the ‘structural factors’ that help to understand the weak negotiating
capacity of developing countries. The problems associated with this
weakness are compounded by industrial countries’ ‘aggressive unilateral
policies’ and their ability to prevail in the deﬁnition of the negotiating
agendas. One of these negotiations involves the MERCOSUR and the
European Union and in Section 12.5, I use this case to illustrate how some
J.J. Nogue ´s 296
ARTICLE IN PRESS
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82of developing countries’ handicaps appear to be operating in practice.
Finally, Section 12.6 suggests some preliminary lessons.
12.2. Economic interests of efﬁcient agricultural producers
in trade negotiations
The interests of developing countries in the negotiations on market access
are signiﬁcant. As an example, I will comment on the gains that efﬁcient
producers,ingeneral,andArgentina,inparticular,couldreapbynegotiating
with countries that provide high protection to their primary sectors and
resource-based manufactures of agricultural origin.
1 These are primarily
industrial countries. As an example, Table 12.1 shows the pattern of
protection of the European Union (EU) for selected chapters of the
harmonizednomenclature.Theseveryhighlevelsofprotectionaffectsome
ofthegoodswhereefﬁcientproducershaveastrongcomparativeadvantage.
In2000forexample,Argentina’sexportsofagriculturalandagro-industrial
products represented 21 and 30% of total exports, respectively.
12.2.1. Agricultural protection and exports
By how much would exports increase if this protection would be
drastically reduced or eliminated? Traditional comparative static trade
analysis shows that the lifting of agricultural protectionism by OECD
countries would have a signiﬁcant impact on exports and GDP. The most
recent estimates based on the GTAP model suggest that this liberalization
could increase total exports of goods by a percentage that, depending on
the underlying elasticities, is at a minimum equivalent to 25% (Casaburi
and Sa ´nchez, 2000). Most of these gains would come from the liberaliza-
tion of European agricultural trade (Sa ´nchez, 2001).
12.2.2. Agricultural protection and ﬁnancial costs
Agricultural protection also increases ﬁnancial costs. To see how this
happens, recall that in emerging countries with open capital accounts, the
market clearing interest rate for the government and most prime companies
is equal to the risk free rate plus the rate of country risk. On the margin at
1 In manufactured products, the comparative advantage of Argentina is determined by its
factor endowment vis-a `-vis the country orgroup of countries withwhom it is negotiating, as
well as by the pattern of their protection. Thus for manufactured goods, past research shows
that vis-a `-vis labor-abundant (capital-abundant) countries, Argentina exports more labor-
intensive (capital-intensive) manufactured products (Nogue ´s, 1985).
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123this rate, foreign investors are willing to lend. Therefore, if protectionism
increases countryrisk, thenthis impliesthatdomestic borrowersare paying
interest costs that are above those that would prevail under free agricultural
trade.
What are the determinants of country risk? A growing number of
analytical and econometric studies have analyzed these determinants and
found that some of the important explanatory variables include (i) growth
expectations: the higher the growth expectations of an economy, the lower
the risk of investing in it; (ii) degree of solvency: the higher the burden
of the debt and the lower the capacity to generate higher levels of exports,
the higher the perceived degree and risks of insolvency, (iii) structural
problems: the more serious the structural problems including most
prominently labor-market rigidities and ﬁscal deﬁcits, the higher the
country risk, (iv) contagion: understood as the ‘ﬂight to quality’ triggered
by the ‘herd instinct’, also raises the country risk when other developing
countries run into ﬁnancial problems; and (v) political uncertainty:
associated, for example, with important differences among leading
politicians regarding the set of appropriate economic policies, is also
expected to increase risks.
While the literature includes a number of cross-country econometric
studies of the determinants of country risk, few of them have focused on
single countries. In a recent paper, Nogue ´s and Grandes (2001) studied the
determinants of Argentina’s country risk by using explanatory variables
discussed above. In our analysis, we chose as the independent variable, the
spread of Argentina’s sovereign bonds (in this case, the ﬂoating rate bond
or FRB), over the US treasury bond of a similar maturity. The selection of
Table 12.1. Agricultural protection in the European Union
Chapter Name Average Tariffs Maximum Tariffs
1 Live animals 26.2 106.0
2 Meat and meat products 33.3 236.4
4 Dairy products, etc. 40.3 146.1
7 Vegetables 12.0 140.7
8 Fruits 9.6 130.4
10 Cereals 47.3 179.7
11 Wheat and mill products 24.5 137.8
12 Seeds, etc. 2.3 67.0
15 Animal and vegetable oil and fats 8.2 89.8
16 Meat and ﬁsh preparations 18.4 50.1
19 Cereal preparations 17.9 48.5
20 Vegetable and fruit preparations 22.7 161.5
Source: Table AIII.1 in World Trade Organization (2000).
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164the independent variable was driven by the fact that the most important
debtor of Argentina is the national government.
Our study concludes that the elasticity of country risk with respect to
the ratio of debt service to exports is 20.68. It also concludes that all of the
other variables mentioned above have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on
Argentina’s country risk and enter the regression with expected signs.
The estimate of this elasticity allows an educated guess of the impact
of agricultural protectionism on Argentina’s excess interest costs paid by
both the government and the private sector. Table 12.2 shows simulation
results regarding the impact of foregone exports due to agricultural
protectionism on country risk. We use two values of the elasticity of
country risk with respect to the debt service ratio to exports: 20.5 and
21.0%. Likewise, based on the study by Sa ´nchez (2001), I use two
estimates of foregone exports due to agricultural protectionism: 25 and
50% of 2000 exports. The results of this simulation indicate that the range
by which agricultural protectionism can increase Argentina’s country risk
goes from 10 to 33%.
At the end of 2000, the stock of total debt (private and public), stood
at around $280 billions and for the year, the average level of country risk
was 672 basis points. Therefore, according to the ﬁgures presented above,
the excess interest costs paid by Argentina’s debtors due to agricultural
protectionism was at a minimum in the order of $1.9 billion (0.10 £ 672 £
$280 billion), or 0.7% of GDP, but it could also be as high as $6.3 billion
(0.33 £ 672 £ $280 billion).
2
12.2.3. Agricultural protection and growth
A higher country risk has not only a direct negative ﬁnancial cost but
also a dynamic negative effect as higher interest rates slow growth.
Table 12.2. Exports and country risk, Argentina 2000
Elasticity of Country
Risk to Debt-Service Ratio
Export Losses from
Protectionism (%)
25 50
20.5 10 17
21.0 20 33
2 To the extent that some of the debt carries a ﬁxed interest rate, these estimates would need
to be adjusted. However, the analysis indicates a sizable negative ﬁnancial costs of
agricultural protectionism that are over and above the negative effects estimated with
traditional comparative static trade models.
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205Figure 12.1 shows a negative relationship between the level of country
risk and the quarterly yearly change in GDP. Obviously, the country’s Q2
long-run growth performance is explained by other factors in addition to
Q1
the level of real interest rates. This negative growth effect is reinforced by
the fact that the dismantling of agricultural protectionism would improve
expected export growth and therefore, expected GDP growth that in the
Nogue ´s and Grandes study (2001) has a very important effect on the level
of country risk. Summing-up, the negative economic and ﬁnancial conse-
quences on Argentina of agricultural protectionism are sizable.
3
12.2.4. Agricultural protection and export prices
The literature has also stressed the impact of agricultural protectionism
on macroeconomic instability. This is attributed to the perversity of the
protectionist policies that attempt to compensate industrial countries’
farmers for international price reductions. These compensatory policies
widen the ﬂuctuations of international prices which in turn are transmitted
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Figure 12.1. Country risk and interannual GDP growth rate
Source: Nogue ´s and Grandes (2001)
3 Argentina has been in recession since early 1999 when its level of country risk began to
increase steadily mainly due to ﬁscal imbalances and the weakening of the political base of
the government. In 2001, this level was above 1000 basis points and after the collapse of
Convertibility in December of 2001 it has reached and stayed at around 5000 basis points
which implies that the country has been shut-off from the private ﬁnancial markets. Mussa
(2002) presents one of the ﬁrst assessments of the ﬁnancial collapse of Argentina.
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246as one of the determinants of the economic cycles of efﬁcient agricultural
producers. For example, between 1997 and 2000, Argentina’s agricultural
export prices declined by 25% while those of agricultural-intensive
manufactures, declined by 24%. Not surprisingly, between 1997 and 1999,
the yearly assistance by OECD countries to their agricultural sectors
increased from $328.7 billion to $361.5 billion. Much of this assistance
was provided in order to compensate farmers from the negative income
effects of international commodity price reductions. In 2000, after several
years of uninterrupted growth, this assistance declined. However, the
OECD analysis indicates that this reduction “…reﬂected international
price and exchange rate movements rather than major agricultural policy
changes. There were no major policy reform initiatives…” (OECD, 2001).
12.2.5. Summing-up
For Argentina and other efﬁcient emerging producers, agricultural
protectionism has signiﬁcant costs that are above those usually estimated.
I have argued that for developing countries with open capital accounts,
the costs of the protectionism encountered by their products in foreign
markets tends to worsen solvency indicators which in turn increases
ﬁnancial costs paid by residents and slows the country’s growth rate.
4
Theseeffects,plusindustrialcountries’statementsthatagriculturalpolicies
could be addressed in international trade negotiations, explain the
signiﬁcant interests of the country and MERCOSUR (as well as other
developing countries), in these negotiations as the way for reducing this
protectionism.
5
4 Grandes (2001) provides additional evidence of the role that exports play as a determinant
of country risk in other developing countries.
5 However, after more than a year of multilateral discussions in the WTO, it is not at all
clear that industrial countries would implement an important reduction of agricultural
protection. The public relation campaign supported by the concept of ‘multifunctionality’
has been developed precisely to resist liberalization. Also, at the time of writing this article,
the US Congress is likely to pass another generous farm bill. These actions indicate that
industrial countries have been successful in ‘building their case’ for continued agricultural
protectionism. In contrast, developing countries have shown a weak capacity to build their
case in order to challenge more effectively, developed countries’ protectionist goals. For
example, the concept of multifunctionality could had been challenged by concepts such as
‘increased rural poverty’ stemming from agricultural protectionism but efforts like this
have not been attempted. In spite of all, MERCOSUR continues to put hopes on multilateral
and regional negotiations with industrial countries as a way of increasing its agricultural
exports and improving growth performance.
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28712.3. The unbalanced Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round is the salient example of an unbalanced negotiation in
terms of the value of concessions given and received by developing
countries. In the context of the topic of this chapter, it is useful to recall
some of the outstanding elements that account for the unbalance.
12.3.1. The UR promise
The launching of the Uruguay Round was heralded by most qualiﬁed
observers and multilateral institutions in part because industrial countries
accepted to include textiles, clothing and agricultural protection on the
negotiating table. The expectation was that this Round would increase the
market access opportunities faced by developing countries in developed
country markets. The promise of these new trading opportunities and
the lack of negotiating experience help to understand why developing
countries accepted an ambitious negotiating agenda that included several
‘new areas’ that had not been the subject of negotiations in the previous
MTNs. This agenda included services and intellectual property where
comparative advantage is clearly on the side of industrial countries. There-
fore, the grand exchange of concessions expected for this Round at its
launching ceremony can be characterized as one where developing
countries would liberalize their markets in the new areas of interest to
industrial countries in exchange for increased market access in agricultural
and labor-intensive manufactured products.
The UR results show a clear imbalance between the market opening
concessions given and received by developing countries.
12.3.2. The unbalanced UR outcome
6
In order to assess the outcome of the UR, I summarize some of the salient
features on the negotiations on market access concessions pertaining Q3
to tariff and non-tariff barriers, implementation problems, services and
intellectual property.
12.3.2.1. Market access
The outcome of these negotiations can be assessed in terms of (i) the
proportion of imports whose tariffs are bound and (ii) the depth of the tariff
cuts. Estimates show that developing country tariff bindings increased
signiﬁcantly in the UR, and came close to the incidence of bindings that
6 This subsection draws from Finger and Nogue ´s (2002).
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328characterizes industrial countries which already was very high before these
negotiations started (Blackhurst et al., 1996). However, most bindings are
at higher levels than applied tariffs.
7
Regarding the proportional depth of the tariff cuts, that of developing
countries has been far more important than that of industrial countries. The
reason for this is that at the start of the UR developing countries protected
their markets more than industrial countries and furthermore, several of
them were implementing signiﬁcant unilateral liberalization programs.
The proportional tariff cuts indicates that developing countries’ import
prices declined by a higher percentage than those of industrial countries
(Finger and Schuknecht, 1999).
In regard to non-tariff barriers, the analysis of this UR obligation shows
that developing and industrial countries have generally complied with this
obligation. In this area, there are no major differences between industrial
and developing countries.
8
The market access negotiations included topics where developing
countries could expect to achieve some form of a balanced outcome. The
promise that this would be the case is probably the most signiﬁcant reason
why developing countries supported the UR negotiations. The fact that
in these negotiations many of them did not achieve their goals implies that
in the other topics where industrial countries appear to have comparative
advantage, the imbalance could only be deepened. In what follows, I
concentrate on implementation issues, services and ‘intellectual property’.
12.3.2.2. Implementation issues
Implementation issues include the problems faced by many developing
countries in trying to comply with some UR agreements including the
Agreement on Custom Valuation, the Sanitary and Phitosanitary Agree-
ment, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Compliance with
7 As developing countries need to stabilize their trade policies, these bindings entail
beneﬁts even if unrequited. Nevertheless, according to tradition and the GATT rules, even
in tariff bindings developing countries should stand ﬁrm and demand reciprocity.
8 Furthermore, while the concessions given by developing countries have already been
implemented, industrial countries’ concessions still have to be completed (case of textiles
and clothing), or still has to be negotiated (case of agriculture). The market access
concessions given by developing countries, and driven mainly from unilateral liberalization
efforts, have in many cases accelerated their trade and output growth. The dark side of the
UR imbalance is not here, but in the continued protectionism of industrial countries in
sectors of the greatest interests to developing countries and also to them as illustrated, for
example, in Hufbauer and Elliot (1994).
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369these agreements requires investment in capital goods, buildings, and
skills. A preliminary assessment indicates that in order to comply with
these obligations, some developing countries have to make investments
that are higher than their combined development budget (Finger and
Schuler, 2000).
At the UR, there was no reﬂection on development needs, development
stages or development priorities. In many cases, industrial countries
standards became the ‘international norm’. Pulling the string has created
serious tensions in the trading system and the hypothesis of this chapter is
that these problems could had been avoided if negotiations would had been
less unequal.
12.3.2.3. Services
In most services (not all), it is the industrial countries that have the
comparative advantage to supply them. For example, many services are
essentially non-tradable and in order for them to be supplied, they require
foreign direct investment (FDI). Statistics show that these FDI ﬂows
have come mainly from industrial countries. For these services which
include areas such as power generation and distribution, gas distribution,
telecommunications,watersupply,ﬁnance,etc.,industrialcountriessought
the ‘right of commercial presence’ and many developing countries binded
important concessions of this type (see Hoekman, 1996; Nogue ´s, 2001 for
a more detailed discussion of Argentina). As a partial exchange to these
valuable rights to ‘commercial presence’, developing countries sought to
achieve concessions in the area of ‘movement of persons’ but industrial
countries have refused to negotiate this topic.
9
Again, the bad side of the services negotiations is not the liberaliza-
tion implemented by developing countries in order to attract FDI. Given
lack of capital and technical skills that characterize most developing
countries, if well regulated, these ﬂows of FDI are expected to have
improved the efﬁciency of their economies. The bad side is that the
concessions that were given were unrequited. This bad side is made even
worse by the fact that apparently, WTO bindings were not an important
factor in attracting FDI ﬂows to service industries (Finger and Nogue ´s,
2002).
9 Note the abysmal imbalance between the multilateral rules that govern international
capital movements, the abundant factor of industrial countries, with those that govern labor
movements, the abundant factor of poor countries. On the huge differences in international
migration ﬂows and the rules that govern them see Lindert and Williamson (2001).
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41012.3.2.4. Intellectual property: the case of patents
for pharmaceutical drugs
The ‘agreement’ on TRIPS was pushed by industrial countries against the
opposition of several developing countries. This occurred against the lack
of theoretical and empirical analysis showing that policy reforms induced
by the TRIPS will increase world welfare, or the welfare of developing
countries.
TRIPS covers several ‘intellectual property’ topics. Given the size
of the pharmaceutical market and the economic interests at stake, I
concentrate remarks on patents for pharmaceutical drugs.
10 At the time
of the UR, the World Intellectual Property Organization (1988) listed
48 countries, most of them developing, as not providing patent protec-
tion for pharmaceutical drugs. Argentina and Brazil have been included
in this list. In the event, all contracting parties to the GATT/WTO
signed the single undertaking UR agreement that included the TRIPS
stipulating that patents should be available to innovations in all activi-
ties, and should last 20 years from the date of ﬁlling.
The patent section of the TRIPS has more to do with the issue of
appropriations of the rents generated in developing countries than with
concerns regarding their innovation and growth potential. In countries
with a sizable share of the pharmaceutical market supplied by domestic
companies like Argentina, Brazil and India, the introduction of patents
will result in a signiﬁcant transfer of rents to industrial countries’
pharmaceutical companies (Nogue ´s, 1993).
11
Finally, it is of interest to recall that as late as the 1970s and 1980s,
several industrial countries still did not provide patent protection to
pharmaceutical drugs. For example, France introduced patent protection
for pharmaceutical drugs in 1960; Germany in 1968; Japan in 1976;
Switzerland in 1977, and Sweden and Italy in 1978. In these countries,
10 Pharmaceutical drugs is one of the industries for whom patent protection is important as
an incentive for investing in R&D. Pharmaceutical drug companies have one of the highest
ratios of R&D to sales and most drug products can be easily copied. Nevertheless, given
that the average costs of marketing a successful drug stands in the hundreds of millions of
dollars (some estimates put it in the order of $400–500 million) there are very few
enterprises if any from developing countries with the ﬁnancial strength to undertake R&D
activities at this scale. This is why in this industry, patents in these countries will most
likely, not result in greater innovation.
11 A recent estimate based on data for 2000, suggests that Argentina could end up
transferring rents from granting patents to pharmaceutical drugs in the order of $425
million per year (Nogue ´s, 2001). Since October 2000, when Argentina began to grant these
patents, these rent transfers have begun to increase.
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451patents were introduced when the size of their pharmaceutical drug
companies was such as to make the likelihood of drug innovation from
investments in R&D high. Patent protection was implemented somewhere
along the development process and it was always a domestic policy
decision taken without regard to foreigninterests. For developingcountries
after TRIPS there is no such independence. For them the adjective has been
‘pirates’ and on this word, an intelligent public relations campaign was
built by international companies.
12
12.3.3. Broken promises and principles
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round is an
example of political correctness. Where promises had to be made they
were made and where principles had to be listed they were listed. The
problem came later when the outcome of the negotiations showed that
signiﬁcant promises and principles had been broken. If there is a new
multilateral round, the lesson is that promises in the Ministerial
Declaration do not matter that much. What in fact will matter is the
capacity of developing countries to oversee that promises and principles be
respected because there is no one who will do the job for them. Reminding
some examples from the UR will help to illustrate.
12.3.3.1. Promise of agricultural liberalization
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration asserts that “Negotiations shall aim to
achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures
affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and
more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines…by improving
market access through inter alia, the reduction of import barriers…”.
The data and sources cited above indicate that this did not occur. What
happened?
Some of the core elements of the Agreement on Agriculture included
the substitution of non-tariff barriers by ad valorem tariffs equivalents
and for industrial countries, the reduction of these tariffs by 36%. Analysis
undertaken on the substitution of NTBs with tariffs suggest that developed
countriesusedtheopportunitytodeclarebasetariffsoftheirURobligations
12 Before the TRIPS, developing countries in particular granted patent duration of differing
length, and in some industries including pharmaceutical drugs, where the satisfaction of
basic needs was an important consideration, they also distinguished between process and
product patents. Clearly, different countries decided their structure of IPRs policies in terms
of what they perceived to be in their interest in much the same way as most developed
countries have always done.
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492that in general were higher, sometimes several times higher, than the
ad valorem equivalents. In fact, there have been instances where the height
of tariff declared to the WTO were such that their reduction by 36% would
imply tariff rates that today are higher than the ones prevailing before the
UR. These ‘dirty tariffs’ were the norm and not the exception (Hathaway
and Ingco, 1996).
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12.3.3.2. Transparency
On transparency, the 1986 Ministerial Declaration asserts that: “Nego-
tiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner…”. In many cases,
transparency was not there. The agricultural dirty tariffs are one example.
A second example is found in the implementation of the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC). While this agreement has complied with the
promise in the Ministerial Declaration that the textiles negotiation should
seek “the eventual integration of this sector into GATT…”, the obscure
part has been in the implementation where some countries have liberalized
much less than the notional liberalization indicated in the ATC.
14
12.3.3.3. Reciprocity
On this, the Ministerial Declaration included the following language under
Section B on ‘General Principles Governing Negotiations’:
“Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas
and subjects to be negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral
demands”. Furthermore, “…the developed countries do not expect
the developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make
13 A puzzling question is why did the Cairns Group allow this to happen? The story I have
been told by an Argentine trade negotiator is that notiﬁcation of the tarifﬁcation exercise to
the WTO was delivered shortly before the deadline. After more than 7 years, negotiators
wanted to wrap-up and there was no interest or spirit in adding another round of exercises
and perhaps negotiations, on what had been a protracted round.
14 The problem lies in the meaning given to the expression ‘integrate into the GATT’ which
is to certify that a textile or clothing product is clean of restrictions to trade such as quotas
that for other manufactured products are illegal under the GATT. According to the ATC,
the indicated proportions are applied to 1990 imports from a list of textile and clothing
products that runs some 30 pages long. During the ﬁrst stages, countries can choose which
products in the list they ‘integrate into the GATT’. This list includes the products where at
least one industrial country has chosen to protect with GATT illegal instruments under the
MFA. Since not all countries protected all of the products in the list, they can choose to
integrate into the GATT those products which they were not protecting with quotas. As a
result, so far liberalization by industrial countries has been smaller than the notional 33%
that should had been liberalized by now (Finger and Nogue ´s, 2002).
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ﬁnancial and trade needs…”.
This section has argued that reciprocity, in the tradition of the ﬁrst
seven rounds of the GATT, was not there.
12.3.4. Summing-up
The UR broke with the GATT of “…reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements …” (Preamble to the GATT). This was the
ﬁrst multilateral round where developing countries participated actively
and the results show that even in market access concessions many of
them including the efﬁcient agricultural producers, never came close to
achieving a balanced exchange. The imbalance in market access was
worsened by (i) agreements requiring socially unproﬁtable investments in
order to comply with ‘obligations’, (ii) unrequited concessions in services
as still no agreement has been reached to regulate the ‘movement
of persons’, and (iii) forced adoption of speciﬁc intellectual property
standards. Two major factors appear to explain this imbalance:
developing countries’ structural negotiating weaknesses interacting with
historically aggressive demands by industrial countries. These and other
factors, discussed in greater detail in Section 12.4, help to understand
why the UR represented the milestone example of ‘unequal exchange’
in international trade negotiations between industrial and developing
countries. Finally, in order to reach an unbalanced UR outcome,
important promises and principles of the multilateral system had to be
broken.
12.4. Management, knowledge, agenda and other handicaps of
developing countries in international trade negotiations
In this section, I summarize some of the handicaps that developing
countries face in the international trade negotiations. Most of the
comments draw from the experience of Argentina and in some instances,
other MERCOSUR countries. Certainly not all of these handicaps
characterize other developing countries but some could be quite extended
and further research could offer more general ﬁndings.
The negative consequences of developing countries’ handicaps are
compounded by industrial countries’ clout to set the negotiating agenda,
and by what has been called, their ‘aggressive unilateralism’ both of
which are discussed brieﬂy in Section 12.4.2. The Section 12.4.3 includes
some tentative conclusions.
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57412.4.1. Some developing countries’ handicaps
In what follows, I will discuss handicaps associated with the following
issues: (1) experience and domestic managerial arrangements, (2) the pros
and cons of negotiating as a member of a trade agreement, (3) lack of
knowledge on economic impacts of reciprocal concessions in different
areas, (4) role of the private–public sector linkages, and (5) the impact of
ﬁnancial problems on trade negotiations.
12.4.1.1. Experience and management arrangements
Many developing countries have given the responsibility of administer-
ing the trade negotiations to their Foreign Affairs Ministries and in
some cases, this may have weakened the negotiating strength. First, in
the new agenda of trade negotiations, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers are
only two of the items on the table. Had trade negotiations remained
focused on these barriers, the decision on which ministry is responsible
for the negotiations would not had been that serious. But as seen, the
negotiating agenda that has been expanded considerably since the
Uruguay Round and now includes a number of topics where concessions
granted sometimes may result in net costs and concessions received in
these same areas could be of not much value. Diplomats have not been
trained to assess the economic dimensions of the increasing number of
items that are being included in most negotiating agendas with industrial
countries. As a consequence, they are more likely to agree to unbalanced
outcomes.
15
Second, most career diplomats are lawyers by training and they do not
necessarily share the same kind of concerns that economists and entre-
preneurs might have as they observe a negotiation becoming unbalanced.
Reaching agreement in a negotiation is usually higher in the ranking
order of priorities of a Foreign Affairs Ministry, than walking away from
a meeting because a balanced and mutually beneﬁcial negotiation is not
being reached. This is more likely to occur when those sitting on the other
side of the table have ‘political clout’.
15 Obviously, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs are advised by other government ofﬁces.
The problem here is that most of these other ofﬁces also have no experience in dealing with
trade negotiations and often they feel removed from the long-run consequences of the
advise they may give. In practice, therefore, except for institutionalized interactions with
the Ministries of Economy, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs often decide by default.
Unequal Exchange 309
ARTICLE IN PRESS
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615Third, the structure of incentives in their careers, implies that diplomats
usually are keen to obtain a foreign assignment as local wages are
generally lowerthanthosethey receive abroad.Underthese circumstances,
it is a challenge to train diplomats with the goal of transforming them in the
elite negotiating group of the country. As career diplomats, sooner or later
they will want to leave for a foreign assignment.
Finally, Argentina and most developing countries have practically very
little experience with international trade negotiations. I have no doubt that
over time the Foreign Affairs Ministries will gain experience, but say 10
years from now most of the international negotiations now under way will
most likely have been concluded.
16 For these negotiations, the experience
gained by then will have come too late.
12.4.1.2. The pros and cons of negotiating as a member
of a trade agreement
In some of the trade negotiations including those with the EU and in
the free trade agreement of the Americas (FTAA), Argentina negotiates
as a member of MERCOSUR. This has one strength and one handicap.
On the positive side, the fact that in the WTO Brazil has still to bind
economically important concessions in areas such as services and
intellectual property implies the other members are assisted by Brazil’s
bargaining chips. The extent to which this edge is of value also depends
on the capacity of Brazil to internalize the gains from the concessions it
will be giving.
On the negative side, in the negotiations of the FTAA and with the EU,
the MERCOSUR members have shown divergent preferences. The reason
apparently lies in the differences in economic structures and patterns
of comparative advantage. Paraguay and Uruguay are more specialized
economies than Argentina and Brazil which shows, for example, in the
concentrationoftrade.Thus,whilein2000theﬁrstﬁveproductsaccounted
for 28% of Argentina’s exports to the EU, in the case of Uruguay they
accounted for 49%.
The consequence of this is that Paraguay and Uruguay are willing to
close a trade deal with fewer concessions received than is the case for
Argentina and Brazil. While a few quotas and tariff concessions might
16 For a country like Argentina, the list includes MERCOSUR–EU, MERCOSUR–US,
MERCOSUR–FTAA, MERCOSUR–Andean Community and the new Doha multilateral
round.
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Argentina and Brazil, it takes more to arrive at an attractive deal.
17
12.4.1.3. Knowledge and trade negotiations
As said, for trade in goods, the meaning of a balanced exchange is quite
straightforward, but in other areas including services, intellectual property
and many others, the impact of reciprocal concessions is not known and
economic assessment is not straightforward. As far as I have been able
to informally assess this problem, many if not most developing countries
are negotiating without an economic assessment of the probable economic
consequences of the agreements they may end up signing. This contrasts
with the situation of industrial countries that apparently know with
precision what they want to achieve in the negotiations. These speciﬁc
objectives are deﬁned in close consultations with interest groups and in
many cases they are supported by a good understanding of economic costs
and beneﬁts. This knowledge comes not only from academic research
but also from government-ﬁnanced analysis and what is probably most
important, from a long experience of close collaboration and exchange of
ideas between the private and public sectors (Dam, 2001).
12.4.1.4. Private sector–public sector linkages
Many developing countries have no tradition of holding consultations
among public ofﬁces and between the public and private sectors for
deﬁning positions for the international trade negotiations. In the Uruguay
Round many countries acted more from the basis of binding unilateral
reforms than from the basis of negotiating an exchange of concessions.
Now these countries ﬁnd themselves in the midst of several negotiations
without the required institutionalized mechanism for private sector–public
sector consultations. Under present conditions, where many developing
countries no longer have a clear public support for unilateral reforms, the
absence of an appropriate consultative mechanism could become a delicate
problem. To see why, consider that the MERCOSUR has entered into an
17 The media has reported several instances where these differences apparently show up.
Take for example the Presidential statements on the occasion of the ﬁrst meeting for a
MERCOSUR–US agreement also known as the 4 þ 1 negotiations. Thus, in an article
published by ‘La Nacio ´n’ entitled ‘Dividio ´ al MERCOSUR la oferta de Washington’
(August 24, 2001), while President Cardoso is quoted as saying that “…if the US presents
good proposals, we will accept immediately an agreement, but if it doesn’t do so, we will
never accept an agreement…”, President Battle from Uruguay is quoted as having said that
he “…strongly favors a MERCOSUR–US agreement…”.
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697important number of international trade negotiations at a moment where
the economies of the region are characterized by declining economic
conditions coupled with very high unemployment rates. This in itself puts
the private sector on guard against governmental decisions in trade
negotiations.
Because of this and other factors, the mandate of the private sector to go
ahead with ongoing trade negotiations is not all that clear. This position
plays well with some of the trading partners with whom Argentina and
MERCOSUR are negotiating. In contrast, Odell (2000) considers that a
strong backing by the private sector of the US negotiators has been a key
issue in explaining many of its negotiating successes.
12.4.1.5. Financial problems and trade negotiations
Many developing countries are facing difﬁcult debt repayment problems
which sometimes can become interlinked with international trade
negotiations in ways that are not the best for the multilateral trading
system or the individual countries. For example, during 2001, in its road
to disaster, Argentina walked into the IMF headquarters more often than
ever before as successive ﬁnancial arrangements failed to convince the
international capital markets that things were moving in the correct
direction. In their efforts to send positive signals, the ﬁnancial
negotiators sought a bilateral trade agreement with the US and under
the pressing economic conditions, they concluded that any deal which
could offer a signal that exports and GDP will soon start growing was
good. For these negotiators, the sooner an agreement was signed the
better quite irrespective of the its ‘content’. In the end, things did not
work either on the ﬁnance or the trade side, but if they would had
worked, it is likely that the trade agreement would not had been the best
for the country simply because it would had been negotiated under a
pressing debt and ﬁnancial situation that was not receptive to trade
negotiations in the interests of the real economy. In any case, I believe
this example illustrates the existence of circumstances where developing
countries’ trade negotiations can be weakened by pressing ﬁnancial
problems.
12.4.1.6. Summing-up
The previous comments illustrate some of the negotiating handicaps that
can characterize developing countries and it is apparent that some
handicaps are serious enough to merit a reappraisal of how they should
approach the trade negotiations. Some of these elements are speciﬁc to
some countries while others could be of a more general nature. These
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knowledge of reciprocal concessions in most areas of the trade agenda.
These and other handicaps require more research and if the hypothesis
of this chapter is conﬁrmed, then the international community has to
reassess the wisdom of calling developing countries to participate in
international trade negotiations without them been adequately prepared to
sit at the table.
12.4.2. Aggressive unilateralism and negotiating agendas
In all of the areas mentioned above, industrial countries hold positions
that result in a negotiating edge over developing countries. There are two
other issues increasing their relative negotiating advantage: aggressive
unilateralism and the ability of industrial countries for setting the
negotiating agendas.
12.4.2.1. Aggressive unilateralism: the case of patents
for pharmaceutical drugs
How did TRIPS came to be? The answer probably varies according to
different types of ‘intellectual property’ protected by this agreement. As
in the previous section, I will concentrate my remarks on patents for
pharmaceutical drugs.
Apparently, the main reason why the patent section of the TRIPS
agreement is what it is, can be traced to the power of rent-seeking groups
including the multinational pharmaceutical drug companies. How did
this occur? In March 1987, only a few months after the UR had been
launched, Mr. Gerald Mossinghoff, then President of the US Pharmaceu-
tical Manufacturers Association (PMA), declared that they were working
with the US Congress to get it to enact “…the intellectual property
revisions of the Omnibus Trade Bill that would strengthen the hand of the
US Government in urging all our trading partners to respect our rights in
inventions and trademarks…”, (Mossinghoff, 1987), Shortly after, the
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 was passed which among other things
adjusted Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act in the direction of making it
easier to introduce retaliatory trade measures based on “…unfair practices
of foreign governments which can be unjustiﬁable, unreasonable,
discriminating or which burden or restricts US commerce…”.
According to the legislation, lack of patent protection is an example
of an ‘unfair practice’, and at the request of the PMA, supported now by
the new ‘strengthened hand’ of the US Government, the USTR initiated
a series of retaliatory actions, or threatened to retaliate against
several developing countries that did not provide patent protection for
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among others.
Section 301 and its clones have been called aggressive unilateralism
(Bhagwati and Patrick, 1990). Powerful economic groups have shown the
ability of convincing legislators that money redistributed to them by
forcing ‘appropriate intellectual property legislation’ around the world, is
money well redistributed. In this sense, 301 is no different than the rents
internalized by agricultural or textile protectionism. There is no way that
developing countries can confront successfully aggressive unilateralism
and when it is present at the negotiating table as it was during the Uruguay
Round, the negotiations become unequal exchanges. The stick supporting
TRIPS created serious problems and is a clear example of what can happen
when some countries are forced to introduce policies with negative
consequences for their development process. The problems were so serious
that at one point they threatened to derail the launching of a new round in
Doha. It was only after the Ministerial Declaration on public health had
been agreed following a very ﬁrm stance by a group of developing
countries, that the round could be launched (World Trade Organization,
2001c).
12.4.2.2. Negotiating agenda and ambitious demands
The UR broke the successful GATT tradition of keeping the negotiating
agenda focused on market access issues. As said, in this round the agenda
began to be expanded to ﬁt the interests of industrial countries’ powerful
economic groups.
18 In contrast, negotiations among developing countries
are not characterized by this heavy agenda or if they include items other
than market access, among themselves they are given plenty of time for
implementation. For example, the agenda of the ongoing MERCOSUR-
Andean Group free trade negotiations only covers trade in goods and
within MERCOSUR, the goal of liberalizing services, is to be achieved in
the long run.
Beyond trade in goods, there appears to be no single item in the
‘new’ and expanded agenda where developing countries have a clear
comparative advantage. As said above, this is an a priori that can only be
cleared with country-speciﬁc studies. If true, this would imply that in
the ‘new agenda for international trade negotiations’, the likelihood that
developing countries could reach balanced and mutually beneﬁcial
18 Exactly what processes explain this expansion is not clear to me. One place to look at in
the US must be the process of ‘getting the votes for fast track’ where powerful lobbies play
a successful game (Dam, 2001).
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multilateral and regional negotiations alike.
19
Not only the agenda but also the demands within each of the agenda
items are ambitious. Take for example the case of services and
intellectual property. In services, “…the US believes that FTAA countries
should negotiate liberalization according to a top-down (negative list)
approach, whereby all sectors are liberalized except where a particular
FTAA country negotiates a reservation for a particular sector or
measure…” Furthermore, the “…United States excludes immigration
policy and access to employment markets from the scope of the services
chapter of the FTAA agreement…”. Certainly, a very ambitious demand
that is nowhere counteracted by an equally aggressive demand by the
Latin American countries (http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/
services.html).
In the patent section of the intellectual property negotiations, the US
proposal requires “…FTAA countries to grant pharmaceutical patent
holders an extension on the term of their patents to compensate for any
unreasonable delay in obtaining marketing approval of their product…”.
Furthermore, the US proposal requires FTAA countries that “…holders
of rights be able to recover proﬁts from infringers…”; that government
agencies be given the “…authority to seize suspected pirated and counter-
feit goods…”, and that “…maximum criminal ﬁnes are high enough
to deter and remove the incentive for infringement…” (http://ustr.gov.
regions.whemisphere/intel.html).
Summing-up, the Uruguay Round implied a signiﬁcant shift from
the GATT trade negotiating agenda. Both in the multilateral and regional
trade negotiations the contents of this agenda, driven mainly by industrial
countries’ interests, continues to be expanded. This implies that trade
negotiations are more likely to result in unbalanced outcomes against
developing countries.
12.4.3. Tentative conclusions
Developing countries bring to the negotiating table what appears to be
serious structural weaknesses. In some cases, they simply do not have
19 Take for example, the FTAA. The initial agenda agreed in the 1995 Ministerial Meeting
covered the following items: market access (including non-agricultural tariffs and NTBs,
rules of origin, customs procedures, standards and safeguards), investment and,
antidumping and countervailing duties. More recently, the agenda has been expanded to
include: government procurement, services, intellectual property, competition policy and
dispute settlement. The Doha agenda is equally or more complex.
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extreme example of ‘unequal exchange capacity’ characterized the
situation of several least developed countries during the Uruguay Round
negotiations (Blackhurst et al., 1999). Apparently, these countries were
asked to sign by the cross and were told that at a later date they would
receive technical assistance explaining them what it was all about.
20
While more advanced developing countries are in a better resource
position, they are also handicapped from what appears to be other weak-
nesses associated with their development stage and lack of experience. A
closer look suggests that there is some room for improvements including
management structure and arrangements for the international trade
negotiations.
There is also a signiﬁcant vacuum in the knowledge of probable
economic effects of exchanging concessions on the vast array of issues on
the table. I fear that this is a handicap that characterizes many developing
countries and if so, they are negotiating blindfolded. In this area, more
research is urgently needed to document this gap but developing countries
could start now investing in necessary knowledge on trade impacts.
A third area to look at is the linkages between the private and
public sector, which also represents a barrier for negotiating effectively.
Reforms have to be supported politically and for those induced by trade
negotiations, this requires an efﬁcient public sector–private sector
consultative mechanism which many developing countries must still
develop.
Compare this picture with the apparent situation in the US taken
fromtheFTAAnegotiations:“The USpositionsweredevelopedwith input
from the full range of federal executive branch agencies…Advise from
non-governmental sources has been obtained primarily through the formal
private sector advisory committee system…The US International Trade
Commission has performed the economic analysis of the probable
economic effects of an agreement” (http://www.ustr.gov). Clearly these
differences indicate the existence of a big gap in organizational arrange-
ments and knowledge between industrial and developing countries.
If developing countries can strengthen some of the above-mentioned
areas, they will be in a stronger position to demand reciprocity where it
corresponds. They will also be in a better position to put on the negotiating
table the topics that are of their interest and if they cannot prevail, at least
they will be better prepared to confront ambitious demands for trade
concessions.
20 In many cases, this assistance never appeared or has been clearly inadequate.
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in the making
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the handicaps discussed in
Section 12.4 appear to be operating in practice. For this I resort to the
MERCOSUR–EU negotiations that are currently under way. I start by
providing a brief background of these negotiations.
12.5.1. Background
In December 1995, MERCOSUR and the EU signed an interregional
cooperation agreement, that seeks to create a trade zone. Since then, both
regions have held a number of meetings and in 1999 the Cooperation
Council, the highest level body of this agreement, launched the preparatory
work for the negotiations. This work is undertaken by the Biregional
Negotiating Committee (BNC) which has already met seven times. The
ﬁrst three meetings dealt essentially with exchanging information and
clearing questions. The fourth meeting of the BNC (BNC IV) held in
Brussels was more substantive in character. Here, the MERCOSUR
informed that in the negotiations, it was seeking a free trade agreement
expressing in this way its goal that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
should not be an obstacle for establishing a free trade agreement. In turn,
the EU expressed that it was working with the goal of presenting to
MERCOSUR in the BNC V, a concrete request and offer for market
access. This proposal would later show to be far from a free trade
agreement.
12.5.2. Differing negotiating goals and strategies
Between BNC IV and BNC V, MERCOSUR drafted a document
deﬁning its negotiating position while the EU completed the preparatory
work for presenting its proposal at the July 2001 meeting. The
MERCOSUR document titled ‘Modalities for the Tariff Negotiations’,
demanded, in line with its goal of establishing a free trade area, that
“…it is necessary to establish a reference tariff on the basis of which
liberalization would be negotiated…”. It further stated that “…speciﬁc
tariffs, mixed tariffs and any other type of tariffs be transformed into an
ad valorem equivalent that for negotiation purposes, would be the
maximum reference tariff…”. In reciprocity to this, the MERCOSUR
offered to dismantle its common external tariff (CET) that is deﬁned on
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21
Obviously, in its to the EU for tarifﬁcation, the goal of MERCOSUR
was that the many trade measures protecting EU agricultural and agro-
industrial products should not be an impediment for the negotiations. In
essence, by proposing to base market access negotiations on transparent
equivalent ad valorem tariffs and to negotiate their dismantling in
10 years, MERCOSUR was offering full reciprocity. In fact as we shall
see, it was offering more as it was not rejecting to negotiate other issues
put on the table by the EU, some of which could be of doubtful economic
interest to the region.
In contrast, the EU never accepted to negotiate on the basis of
equivalent ad valorem tariffs. It argued that this would go against the
CAP, which it has consistently argued, is only prepared to negotiate in
a multilateral round.
22 MERCOSUR in turn argued that its goal was to
put the regional negotiations on an equal footing for both sides, and not
to challenge the CAP. In fact, the EU strategy has been to take the
MERCOSUR to a situation of negotiating speciﬁc elements of the CAP on
a product-by-product basis. The differences between the MERCOSUR
proposal and that of the EU are signiﬁcant.
12.5.3. The EU proposal
At the July 2001 meeting, the EU presented its proposal. In contrast
to MERCOSUR’s offer for a free trade agreement, it is difﬁcult to see
how the EU proposal could had been more mercantilist. The following are
some characteristics of this proposal:
(a) Both sides should dismantle ad valorem tariffs in a period of 10 years
but as we shall see this proposal hides an important imbalance in
market access concessions.
(b) With this proposal, the EU ensures free access to the MERCOSUR
market for manufactured products, the most protected sector of
21 The document presented suggestions regarding other ‘technical’ aspects of the
negotiations. Probably the most important among these other issues was that
MERCOSUR agreed to follow the EU proposal that the agreement could be
implemented in 10 years.
22 In Nogue ´s (2002) I argue that it is very unlikely that the Doha Development Round
will result in important rather than cosmetic agricultural trade liberalization of OECD
economies.
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open EU market.
(c) In agricultural and agro-industrial products the story is very different.
Except for few countervailing measures, agricultural protection in
MERCOSUR is also based on ad valorem tariffs. Therefore, the EU
proposal to dismantle ad valorem tariffs would also imply a high
degree of access to the MERCOSUR market for their agricultural
products but not vice versa.
(d) Based on equivalent tariffs, Table 12.1 showed the high levels of
protection granted by the EU to agricultural and agro-industrial
products where MERCOSUR has comparative advantage. In addition
to ad valorem tariffs, the EU imposes seasonal tariffs, speciﬁc tariffs,
mixedtariffs,exportsubsidies,budgetsupport,tariffescalation,special
agricultural safeguards and quotas.
23 Among all of these policies, the
EUhasofferedtodismantleonlytheadvaloremtariffs.Howsigniﬁcant
is this offer to dismantle ad valorem tariffs? Not very signiﬁcant.
(e) The EU agricultural and agro-industry policies are an example of
high protection administered in a very intransparent way. It can
take several months to gain a detailed knowledge of this protection
and then: how much should MERCOSUR ‘pay’ the EU for it to
dismantle the ad valorem tariff or other components of its agricultural
protection? The complexity of this problem increases as we go into a
product-by-product negotiation. Different instruments protect differ-
ent products but in general, ad valorem tariffs do not provide the bulk
of protection to agricultural products.
24
23 Some products of important export value for the MERCOSUR also face sanitary and
phytosanitary barriers some of which appear to be supported by weak scientiﬁc evidence.
24 The nature of the complexity of EU agricultural protectionism can be seen in two
examples. The ﬁrst example is fruits such as pears, apples, oranges, etc. For speciﬁc periods
of the year classiﬁed by month or consecutive months, fruits are protected by ad valorem
and speciﬁc tariffs. Given the objective of protecting incomes of their farmers, the EU-
speciﬁc tariffs vary inversely with the level of import prices. The result of this is that for
pears, for example, there are 10 rates varying between 0 and 10.4%. In addition, speciﬁc
tariffs also vary by time of the year so that the number of possible combinations protecting
pears is very high. In simulations performed by Argentina’s Secretariat of Trade, the EU ad
valorem tariff equivalent, including the effects of speciﬁc tariffs, protecting pears varies
between 0 and 77%. In other products like chocolates, protection varies according to
product contents. Thus, protection for chocolates having 1% starch, 2% fat, 20% milk
protein and 25% sugar, is deﬁned in a table of codes. For chocolates ﬁlled with alcohol, the
code number is 7161. In another table, this code number deﬁnes a speciﬁc tariff that has to
be added to the corresponding ad valorem tariff. Different chocolates have different
contents and there is a corresponding protection code for each one.
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1025(f) Furthermore, in contrast to the initial MERCOSUR proposal that did
not exclude any product, the EU proposal excludes around 1000 tariff
lines of which 781 are products of great export interest for Argentina.
Estimates of the ad valorem equivalent by the Secretariat of Trade
for a sample of the excluded products show a high average protection
of 36% with a maximum of 463%. Exclusion of these products
signiﬁcantly reduces the MERCOSUR export potential of a trade
agreement with the EU.
(g) In addition to full access to the MERCOSUR goods markets, the EU is
demanding (i) full reciprocity in textiles and footwear, (ii) standstill
and rollback, (iii) for ﬁsheries products, liberalization will take into
account ‘access to water resources’, and (iv) duties on wine will
be abolished in the framework of a separate agreement including
‘protection of geographical indications and traditional expressions’.
In Argentina, textiles and footwear are two ‘sensitive’ labor-intensive
sectors. Standstill and rollback have not been discussed in detail
but given the CAP, there is no way that a realistic rollback by the EU
can offer gains in market access that could match a similar reform
by the MERCOSUR. The details on access to water resources and
intellectual protection for geographical indications have also not
been speciﬁed but Argentina’s national ﬁshing ﬂeet is not signiﬁcant
and, although it has good wines, it has not developed a tradition of
‘geographical denominations’. Summing-up, reciprocal concessions
in these areas of the expanded negotiating agenda appear to have
much greater commercial value for the EU than for the MERCOSUR.
(h) In addition, the EU has demanded negotiations on government pro-
curement and services where it seeks a high degree of access to the
MERCOSUR markets. In services for example, it seeks access to all
markets except audio–visual services, national maritime cabotage
and air transport services. The proposal clariﬁes that the ‘right of
commercial presence’ does “…not extend to seeking or taking
employment in the labor market or confer a right of access to the labor
market of another party”.
25 Regarding government procurement, the
25 Quote taken from the EU document entitled ‘European Union Working Text: Trade in
Services’, draft July 2, 2001. As a contrast, most ancestors of argentine nationals were
Europeans and Argentina was, and by international standards remains, an open immigration
country. Lindert and Williamson (2001) quantify the signiﬁcant contribution of Argentina
as a recipient country of European migration during, what they call, the ﬁrst wave of
globalization between 1870 and 1910. Rules on ‘movement of persons’ have certainly
changed drastically.
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MERCOSUR governments than vice versa.
12.5.4. Interpreting the EU proposal
The difference in market access offered by the MERCOSUR (free trade)
and EU proposals is so big that one wonders what are the underlying
goals of the latter. For the MERCOSUR the goal has been a free trade
agreement, while for the EU it has been a mercantilist agreement. How-
ever, this mercantilism is so unreasonable that under normal conditions
no country or group of countries should take more than minimal resources
to reject it. Why did the EU present such an offer?
One interpretation is that, given the bad economic situation of the
MERCOSUR region, the EU concluded that it has a chance of walking
away with a trade agreement in favor of its exporters without its import-
competing industries having to ‘pay the costs’. A second interpretation is
that the EU is not really interested in reaching a trade agreement with the
MERCOSUR and that when it presented its proposal in the July meeting,
it was simply ﬁlling a diplomatic formality. A third possibility is that
the proposal represents a negotiating tactic and this is in fact what the
MERCOSUR has concluded and in line with this, it has agreed to continue
negotiating. This state of affairs did not change during the sixth and
seventh meeting of the BNC, this last one held in April 2002.
12.5.5. Illustrating the working of the handicaps
Since the July meeting, some events have taken place that illustrate how
the handicaps listed in Section 12.4 are working in the MERCOSUR–EU
negotiations. First, preparing a counter-offer to the EU proposal requires a
high degree of coordination between the public and private sectors. This
is needed, for example, to determine in which of the possible timetables
for tariff dismantling that have been decided on a preliminary basis (0, 4, 7
and 10 years), each product should be included. Both the public and private
sectors have shown not to be well prepared for this exercise.
Second, as argued in Section 12.5.4, the discussion within the
MERCOSUR, has also led to differing interpretations of the EU proposal.
Thus, while Argentina and Brazil have in general maintained a critical
stance, Uruguay remains an enthusiastic supporter of the EU offer. As
said in Section 12.5.4, Uruguay expects more from a product-by-product
negotiation than do Argentina and Brazil.
Third, within Argentina, there have been inter-agency differences.
While the trade negotiators want to maintain a strong stance vis-a `-vis
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opportunity for the country’.
Fourth, the European lobby has been aggressive in pressing
MERCOSUR. This lobby includes visits to the region by Mr. Pascal
Lamy and Mr. Fischler. For example, Mr. Fischler, the EU agricultural
commissioner, has been quoted as saying that the EU “…has shown to be a
good client and friend of MERCOSUR…” as it has presented an ample
offer to liberalize agricultural trade. Furthermore, the EU “…is waiting a
constructive counter-offer”, and “…it is seeking to arrive at a balanced
agreement…”.
26 Quite sarcastic.
Finally, there is little if no knowledge of possible economic impact
in practically all of the subjects that have been put on the table by the
EU. Except for some aggregate estimates of economic impacts for
liberalizing trade in goods, there is no knowledge regarding the possible
effects of negotiating reciprocal concessions with the EU in services,
government procurement, geographical denominations, access to ﬁshing
waters, etc.
12.5.6. Summing-up
The MERCOSUR–EU negotiations represent an example of a negotia-
tion where on one side of the table are developing countries with their
handicaps and on the other side are trading partners with clout that
know very well what they want from the agreement, i.e. an example of
an ‘unequal exchange’ negotiation leading most likely to an unbalanced
outcome. While MERCOSUR entered this negotiation candidly expect-
ing to arrive at a free trade agreement, this never appears to have been
the goal of the EU. Instead, this goal is for a highly mercantilist
agreement of little economic value in relation to what MERCOSUR
could internalize in a reciprocal and mutually beneﬁcial agreement.
The apparent strategy of the EU has been to take the MERCOSUR to
negotiate on a product-by-product basis: “I give you minimal conces-
sions and the honor of having completed a negotiation with the EU, and
you give me your markets. This is a fair deal”. I believe that the only
way that MERCOSUR could conclude a reasonable negotiation is by
standing ﬁrm on its initial proposal of negotiating a free trade agreement
on the basis of clear principles and transparent instruments.
26 ‘Intenta la UE negociar sobre agricultura’, La Nacio ´n October 4, 2001.
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114812.6. Drawing some lessons
The Uruguay Round opened a divide in the trading system in such a way
that we can talk of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ it. The GATT trading system, in
which developingcountries did not participate much, was moretransparent
and balanced than the WTO system. In the old system, the weaker
countries could feel quite assured that the hegemonic countries would not
make an abuse of their power. This appears to be no longer the case and
now differences in resources, experience, managerial capacity, knowledge,
and negotiating strength matter. This matters not only in multilateral
negotiations but also in regional negotiations involving developed and
developing countries. Differences in these factors are so important that
sitting both groups of countries together in international trade negotiations
is likely to generate an ‘unequal exchange process’ that results in
unbalanced outcomes with costs to developing countries and the trading
system. This analysis indicates some suggestions.
12.6.1. Principles in trade negotiations
It would appear that one way of modifying at least partly the outcome of
these negotiations, would be to go back to respect the fundamental GATT
principle, now included in the WTO, of negotiating on the basis of
reciprocityand mutualbeneﬁts.Whoshould ensurethatthis basicprinciple
is respected? The answer is that it is up to the developing countries to
defend their interests which takes me to a second suggestion.
12.6.2. Blocking negotiations: a defensive strategy
This one is borrowed from Mike Finger in a personal communication:
“Developing countries have to have the courage to insist that all reasonable
doubt as to the economic effects of a proposed agreement be removed
before they allow a decision to be approved”. This is a defensive strategy
that, if repeated every time there is ‘reasonable doubt’, might eventually
generate forces in favor of rebalancing the odds in trade negotiations.
12.6.3. Management arrangements, knowledge
and other domestic reforms
In addition to ‘blocking’, developing countries should look into their
negotiating arrangements. In some, there appears to be room for improving
the management and skills allocated to the negotiations. They can also
increase their internal cohesiveness by inter alia, strengthening the public
sector–private sector consultation process. Additionally, with relatively
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1189few resources, developing countries can gain greater knowledge on net
gains associated with reciprocal negotiations in the different areas of the
agenda. These are some suggestions which I think would strengthen the
negotiating capacity of developing countries.
12.6.4. Congressional oversight
I have argued that many countries are ill equipped for meeting the
challenges of trade negotiations successfully and this implies that they are
assuming risks that are higher than necessary. In these circumstances, as
is the case in the US, the Congress of developing countries could assume
the responsibility of providing an oversight function to ensure that the
negotiations undertaken by the Executive Power are balanced and, in fact,
result in a mutually beneﬁcial exchange of concessions for their countries.
Such an oversight role would hopefully result in a better outcome and
would also strengthen the negotiating positions of developing countries
vis-a `-vis developed countries’ trading partners.
12.6.5. Aggressive unilateralism
Regarding the trading system, the ‘implementation problem’ encountered
by many developing countries is the result of the ‘unequal exchange’
in the Uruguay Round negotiations where industrial countries knew with a
high degree of precision what they were signing and developing countries
often did not have a clue. One message of this chapter is that if these
types of exchanges are not rebalanced, the trade negotiations will continue
generating ‘implementation and other problems’. In this regard, one salient
characteristic of the Uruguay Round negotiations was the presence of
‘aggressive unilateralism’. We live in a new world where the strengthening
of core economic interlinkages between countries, are a core ingredient
of successful diplomacy. These interlinkages are also built in trade
negotiations but if these are to be successful, aggressive unilateralism
must go and give room to a constructive dialogue between countries
in different development stages. This dialogue should be open enough
to deﬁne agendas of interests to all countries without the presence of a
big stick.
12.6.6. Learning more about decision mechanism
Ever since the completion of the Uruguay Round, well-intentioned
researchers, politicians and other people of inﬂuence have been suggesting
ways of ‘ﬁxing’ the trading system. This research has uncovered many
problem areas that have led to several reform proposals. If the hypothesis
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1230of this chapter is correct, the suggestion is to take this research one step
back and ask what elements of our decision-making mechanisms explain
why the system evolved from negotiations with reciprocity and mutual
beneﬁts, to ‘unequal exchange negotiations’. I believe we need to get a
better grasp of this if we want to make suggestions for lasting reforms to
the nature of negotiations. On the developing country side, I have
supported my thesis of ‘unequal exchange’ by looking into some of the
elements that characterize the decision process of a few developing
countries.It is crucialfor thisresearch to incorporateindustrialcountries as
well. We need to enquire, for example, about the underlying forces that
explain why these countries have been moving away from the basic GATT
principles they once created and protected. Is, for example, the process of
‘buying the votes for fast track’ important for explaining the expansion of
the trade negotiating agenda?
12.6.7. ‘Smoke and mirrors’ of trade negotiations
versus unilateral reforms
For some developing countries, the potential gains to be achieved by
participating in international trade negotiations are very high. This comes
out very clearly for efﬁcient agricultural producers. Because of these gains,
many developing countries appear to be paralyzed by the promise of these
negotiations and may have put aside unilateral reforms. Nevertheless,
developing countries must learn to see behind the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of
these negotiations.
The lesson here is that in the absence of reforms to the process of
multilateral trade negotiations, the priorities of these alternative strategies
have to be reassessed. Many developing countries have to assume that they
will gain little in this process and put unilateral reforms again as national
priorities. Developing countries should continue implementing all the
necessary liberalization reforms supported by their societies, but they
should consider binding in the WTO only those that bring clear economic
gains. Binding additional concessions, as many did in the Uruguay Round,
should be considered only in the event of clear reciprocity.
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